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1. Introduction 
A big part of getting on in life is doing well at school, and doing well at school is 
helped by attending a good school. Since not all schools are good schools, places at 
good schools need to be allocated. These two assumptions – that schools matter and 
schools differ – mean that education markets have to solve an important assignment 
problem. In particular, the allocation across pupils from differing family backgrounds 
is an issue of interest for social mobility. This case is made stronger by recent 
research showing the increasing importance of family income in influencing life 
outcomes
1. Education markets in England can be characterised as utilising a mix of 
choice-based schooling and neighbourhood-based schooling, so this study also relates 
to the debate on the effects of school choice. 
In this paper we estimate the chances of poor and non-poor children getting places in 
good schools
2. In a general sense this depends on demand expressed by parents and 
children, the availability of such places and the nature of the assignment mechanisms 
that resolve conflicting choices. In England, the details of these mechanisms are given 
by Local Education Authority’s (LEA) and schools’ admissions procedures. One of 
the key factors is location – distance between school and home, with those living 
nearest having priority. West et al. (2004) show that 86% of secondary schools 
(grammar schools excluded) have distance as part of their admissions criteria. This 
has a direct influence on the relationship between poverty and school assignment. The 
spatially concentrated demand pushes up house prices
3 and generates a correlation 
between poverty and distance from a good school. Our dataset allows us to measure 
distance very precisely and characterise the pupil’s very local area. This allows us to 
analyse the relationship between poverty, location and school assignment.  
This issue is not straightforward. The composition of the school affects the publicly 
available measure of school quality, which in turn influences parental choice of 
school. Non-poor children tend to score more highly all else equal, so schools with 
                                                 
1 For example, Blanden, Goodman, Gregg and Machin (2004) show decreasing intergenerational 
mobility in the UK.  
2 We define all these terms properly below. We use ‘poor’ as a short hand for ‘eligible for Free School 
Meals’, which derives in turn from eligibility for certain welfare payments. A ‘good’ school is in the 
top third of published league tables for performance.  
3 For evidence see G&M. others   2 
high proportions of poor children will tend to produce lower average scores. Thus a 
simple correlation between school quality and the proportion of poor children will not 
necessarily be informative about the assignment mechanism and school admissions. 
We adopt a number of different approaches to deal with this problem.  
The simple unconditional difference in probabilities of attending a good school is 
substantial. A pupil from a poor family is 17 percentage points less likely to go to a 
good school, 14 points once we include other individual controls, but not location. 
This is relative to an overall ratio of 29% of places in good schools. If we add controls 
for characteristics of the pupil and her neighbourhood, both very local (a street – less 
than twenty dwellings) and broader (about 12,000 people), the difference falls to 
around 5 percentage points. However, it may be that these controls do not fully 
capture the features of a location and its spatial relationship to the surrounding 
schools. So we run an analysis that controls completely for location. We compare 
pupils living in the same place, neighbours, but varying in poverty status
4. A full unit 
postcode contains on average about 15 (contiguous) dwellings, although obviously 
only some of these will house families with secondary school-aged children. We 
exploit this within-street variation and also control for other personal characteristics 
including prior test scores. Children from poor families are significantly less likely to 
go to good schools. The difference is 2 percentage points, relative to an overall 
difference in that sample of 14 percentage points. This result, which is likely to be a 
lower bound on the effect, shows that location is not the only factor reducing the 
chances of poor children from attending good schools. This difference captures the 
widely discussed “working the system” by more affluent parents.  
We focus in on a particular case of the pupil-school assignment to examine whether a 
pupil attends her nearest school, as a function of its quality and her characteristics. 
The striking result is that while non-poor families exhibit the expected behaviour – a 
higher probability of attending the school the higher its quality – this is not true for 
pupils from poor families. This result is robust to controlling for a very wide set of 
controls for distance and neighbourhood.  
The paper makes two contributions to the evidence on school choice. First, we re-run 
the within-postcode analysis by decile of the feasibility of choice. This is measured by 
                                                 
4 We discuss the selection issues involved below.   3 
each pupil’s minimum distance to reach three schools. We show that the lower chance 
of poor children attending a good school is essentially unaffected by the degree of 
choice. It neither improves with choice as supporters would suggest (through the 
lesser importance of location), nor deteriorates as opponents fear (through more 
covert selection by schools). Second, we can compare the importance of location in 
explaining the relative chances of children from poor families. To be precise, we ask 
how important is “choice of location” relative to “working the system” in the 
strategies used by the non-poor to get their children into good schools. It is important 
to be clear on the interpretation of this finding that location matters. We are not 
claiming that location is randomly allocated across families, and that this is a causal 
relationship between location and school assignment. It is not surprising that 
distance/location matters as it is in admissions procedures. Rather, the analysis 
describes the strategies of parents to achieve the school outcome they want, given the 
assignment rule and their demand for a school place.  The optimal responses to 
assignment rules that privilege location and (implicitly) some pupil attributes, are to 
acquire the right location, or to “work the system” to make the pupil attributes clear. 
This split between location and other factors tells us about the main strategies that 
parents employ.  
Concerns about equity in the schooling system are of course very long standing. 
Furthermore, the idea that school choice might be good for the disadvantaged is also 
far from new (see for example Jencks, 1970). But more recently most of the choice 
research has been focussed on the impact on average attainment, or sorting of pupils 
across schools
5. Recent empirical contributions divide into those studying specific 
targeted choice schemes (for example, Cullen, Jacob and Levitt, 2006), and those 
examining a generalised system of school choice (for example, Hoxby, 2000, in the 
US and Sandstrom and Bergstrøm, 2002, in Sweden). We can also characterise 
studies as analysing the partial equilibrium impact on the pupils making choices (for 
example, Howell, 2004 on the New York school choice programme), or focussing on 
the impact on the school system as a whole (Hoxby, 2000, Hoxby, 2003b, and the 
controversy between Rothstein, 2005, and Hoxby, 2005). Bayer and McMillan (2005) 
                                                 
5 Recent contributions surveying the field include Howell and Peterson (2002), Hoxby (2003a), Ladd 
(2002) and Neal (2002).   4 
model the general equilibrium of residential and school choice. Lavy (2006) seems to 
be the only study looking at both effects on individuals and on the system as a whole.  
There are very few studies on choice for Britain. While Bradley et al (2000) find some 
positive impact of competitive links between schools’ exam results, three recent 
studies find little evidence of a strong impact of choice on overall standards. Clark 
(2004) finds that schools located near to “opting-out” schools, arguably facing 
increased competition, did not respond by improving outcomes. Gibbons, Machin and 
Silva (2006) use a cross-section of primary schools and instrument their measure of 
competition using distance from the market boundary; they find little effect of 
competition on outcomes. Burgess and Slater (2006) exploit a change in the 
boundaries of local education markets to generate an exogenous change in the degree 
of choice. They find some hint of an effect of the change on standards in the expected 
direction, but not a statistically significant effect.  
Looking specifically at educational outcomes for children from poor families, there 
has been considerable work in the US on the impact of voucher schemes for 
disadvantaged children (eg Howell, 2004, and some of the papers collected in Hoxby, 
2003a). Much of the recent work in the UK on the importance of socio-economic 
background has focussed on higher education (for example, Galindo-Rueda et al, 
2004, and Vignoles and Machin, 2006). In secondary schools, there has been interest 
in the role of ability selection in grammar schools (Galindo-Rueda and Vignoles, 
2005) and the relationship between income sorting between schools and choice (for 
example Burgess et al, 2006, Allen and Vignoles, 2006). But there appears to be no 
analysis of the role of family poverty in the assignment of children to schools in the 
majority of education markets in England which do not select on ability. 
The next section sets out an economic modelling framework for our approach, and the 
following section details the data used. Section 4 presents the results and section 5 
concludes. 
2. Modelling Framework 
We model the assignment of children to schools, as a function of the characteristics of 
the school and of the children. The observed assignment is a realisation of an 
underlying process composed of two decisions: applications by parents and children   5 
for places in particular schools (demand), and the administrative procedures that 
allocate children to schools given their choices (assignment rule). This is like many 
matching problems – how does the labour market allocate workers to firms; how do 
particular matches form in the marriage market? We discuss the economic analysis of 
these processes below. For studies of school assignment explicitly based on a two-
sided matching approach see Abdulkadiroðlu et al (2005) on Boston and 
Abdulkadiroðlu et al (2005) on New York. 
a) Notation 
In an area, there are S schools denoted s, and P children denoted i. A child’s poverty 
status is measured by her Free School Meals (FSM) eligibility, denoted fi. The school 
average FSM eligibility is  s f . A child’s score in the tests at the end of compulsory 
schooling (known as GCSEs) is qi, and her score in the test just before secondary 
school (Key Stage 2) is our measure of prior ability, denoted ki. The average GCSE 
score of school s for time/cohort t is qs,t. We take this as the public quality score. We 
define a ‘good school’ as one in which the average quality score is above some 
threshold. In the empirical work, we take the top third of the distribution of qs,t. 
A pupil’s location is Li. Denote pupil i’s nearest school as n(i) and pupil i’s actual 
school attended as a(i), The distance between pupil i and school s is dis. This paper 
analyses the outcome of the processes that map the characteristics of child i to the 
characteristics of school Z if a(i) = Z.  
In particular, we focus on the quality of school assigned to pupil i. As noted above, 
the quality score for a school s at time t is the school mean GCSE score for the cohort 
finishing in t, qs,t. We write the quality of the school to which pupil i from cohort t is 
assigned as qa(i, t), t-6. This emphasises that the quality score was achieved by a prior 
cohort of pupils – given the timing of decisions and the duration of compulsory 
secondary schooling, a cohort 6 years older than the entering one.  
This matters because of the way that the quality score is generated. We assume that an 
individual pupil’s score depends on her own characteristics and the value-added 
provided by the school. The most important characteristics are likely to be the pupil’s 
prior attainment and poverty status. So for a pupil: qi = a.fi + b.ki + vs + ui, where vs 
is the school’s value-added and ui is unobserved factors and testing noise. Adding up   6 
over the school for pupils in cohort t gives:  st st st s st u k f v q + + + = b a . This quality 
measure therefore reflects both the school’s value added and its peer group (as 
measured by  st k and  st f ). In terms of the child-school assignment mechanism, the 
school composition that the quality score and therefore assignment depends on is one 
from six years before the assignment decision.  
b) Demand and the Assignment Rule 
Modelling the general equilibrium of a process involving simultaneous choice of 
location and school is complex, see for example Bayer and McMillan (2005). 
Furthermore, if peer groups are important in influencing educational outcomes, then 
analysing school assignment means searching for an equilibrium in a complex game 
(see Epple and Romano, 1998, 2003). Typically, simulations are required to capture 
the salient features of the model (Nechyba, 2003, 2004). These studies, modelling the 
US education system, necessarily ignore important features of the school market in 
England. Perhaps the key feature is that popular schools in England cannot expand 
much to deal with a lot of applications, and so over-subscribed schools have to choose 
pupils. Thus we cannot simply import these models to study the school market in 
England. We sketch out the nature of the processes underlying the reduced form 
assignment function that we estimate below. 
We assume a family’s utility depends on the present value of future income 
generation from educational achievement, on income left for consumption after 
school-associated costs, and on other aspects of the school experience. Thus demand 
for a school place reflects a demand for teaching quality, school ethos, peer group 
characteristics, distance from home, and other facilities. The resulting choice of 
school will depend on the family’s preferences, family structure (how many children 
for example), the child’s ability, income, and the prices of complements (school 
uniform, travel time) and substitutes (private schooling). State schooling itself in 
England is free. The demand is expressed as applications to schools: students make 
applications to a small number of different schools (typically 3 to 6).  
The administrative procedures are complicated in England in that some schools act as 
their own admissions authority
6, but most schools have their admissions administered 
                                                 
6 Foundation and Voluntary-Aided schools.   7 
by the Local Education Authority (LEA). Schools cannot change size very rapidly, so 
a popular school with more applications than places cannot expand within the period 
to provide more places. In this case the admissions authority (school or LEA) has to 
choose the pupils to accept. Schools have incentives to try to pick the more able 
pupils, since as we have noted above, the quality score for schools is affected by their 
pupil intake.  
Demand and the assignment rule together deliver an allocation of children to schools. 
This is the map from pupil characteristics to school characteristics. We do not in this 
paper attempt to separately identify the role of demand and the assignment rule. So a 
finding that characteristic x influences the outcome could arise because that 
characteristic influences demand and/or the assignment rule. 
We characterise the outcome of the allocation in a general form as: 
( ) { } i i i i i t t i a Z k f L g f q e + = - , , , 6 ), , (           (1) 
where Zi captures other characteristics of the pupil such as ethnicity, and ei denotes 
unmeasured factors, discussed below. The term g(Li) represents all the relevant 
features of the location: 
( ) ( ) 6 , 6 , 2 6 , 1 2 1 .., , , ; .., , , ; - - - = t S t t Si i i i i q q q d d d g L g W       (2) 
where W measures all the characteristics of the area. Such factors include the nature 
of the neighbourhood and the neighbours, transport links, the reputation of an area, 
and the presence of local amenities that may induce unmeasured differences in the 
characteristics of the families living there. g() also contains the set of distances from 
pupil i’s home to each school in the area, and the corresponding quality score of each 
school. Distance may well influence demand in terms of minimising travel time. It 
also plays a prominent part in the assignment rules. Most schools and LEAs have 
school/home proximity as a key criterion for allocating scarce places. One potential 
outcome is that pupils are allocated to their nearest school: a(i, t) = n(i, t). This is the 
essence of the neighbourhood schooling assignment rule, as a leading alternative to a 
choice-based assignment rule. In this case the role for demand is in the choice of 
location. The role of distance in influencing school admissions is often expressed in 
terms of catchment areas. However, these are not very useful for analysis as realised 
catchment areas are endogenous. A school in high demand will have to draw a   8 
catchment area very tight around the school, whereas a less popular school will have a 
much broader area. We rely on measured distances. 
The remainder of f() contains characteristics of the pupil. Again, these may influence 
both demand and assignment. Explicit selection of pupils on the basis of ability or 
income is not permitted in the admissions code, but it is well established
7 that schools 
engage in certain practices (such as interviewing) to implicitly establish ability or 
family background. The measure of ability we use is performance in the Keystage 2 
test taken just before entry into secondary school (details in the data section). The 
timing of this is such that the outcome cannot be known before the school assignment 
decision is made. Thus its role is as a measure of general ability, not an explicit factor 
in the allocation decision.  
Finally, the term ei captures other factors that influence demand or assignment. For 
example, admissions authorities use the presence of siblings in a school as an 
important criterion in allocating subsequent children. This factor is assumed to a first 
approximation to be orthogonal to ability and poverty.  
The terms on the right hand side of (1) will likely be correlated amongst themselves. 
We know that family background affects exam outcomes, so that will generate a 
correlation between f and k. Distance from good schools is likely to be correlated with 
f through the working of the housing market, so this is a little more complex. All this 
implies that not controlling appropriately for k and L will generate a correlation of qa(i, 
t), t-6 with f.  
c) Reverse causation?  
In the empirical work below, we model the outcome of the assignment process given 
by (1). We interpret the estimated relationship between the school’s quality score qa(i, 
t), t-6 and a student’s personal characteristic, fit, as representing the outcome of the 
assignment process. But we address the possibility that there is an alternative basis for 
the correlation, namely from student characteristics to the outcome score.  
                                                 
7 For example, West (2003): “Ongoing analysis suggests that one in five secondary schools used 
overtly selective criteria (e.g. partial selection on the basis of ability/aptitude, primary school record) or 
potentially discriminatory criteria (e.g. priority to children of school employees/former 
pupils/governors) or subjective criteria/practices allowing for administrative discretion (e.g. interviews, 
compassionate/pastoral factors).”    9 
It is clear that there is no straightforward reverse causation because the quality score 
relates to the performance of a cohort of children in the school six years before the 
cohort studied here: we are not simply regressing the score of a group of pupils on 
their own characteristics.  
But there may be a lot of persistence in school attendance. There are two ways in 
which this might arise. First, suppose that schools were located on “islands”, with 
little or no mobility between them. All students from succeeding generations therefore 
go to the school on their island. If this were true, then the allocation outcome would 
be trivial: all would go to their island school (a(i, t) = n(i, t)) and qa(i, t), t-6  = qn(i, t), t-6. 
In terms of relating pupil characteristics to school characteristics, everything would 
hinge on which island people lived on.   
However, this does not describe the situation for secondary schools in England, 
though it may be a closer approximation to the way that school districts operate in the 
US. We have shown (see Burgess et al, 2006) that 54% of children do not in fact 
attend their nearest school. Furthermore, 28% do not attend one of their nearest three 
schools. Thus there is a huge amount of mobility from neighbourhoods to different 
schools. The excess distances travelled to attend non-local schools are not trivial. On 
average this is 2.3km, relative to a mean distance to nearest school of 2.8km (median 
1.7km). This complex pattern of school attendance can be illustrated by an example in 
Birmingham. We take five regular schools (comprehensive, mixed gender, non-faith). 
Using precise data on pupil location (see below), we can rank pupils in terms of 
distance from their school attended. In Figure 1, we plot the 50% distance contour for 
each school – that is, the line that encompasses the nearest 50% of that school’s 
intake. The key point to derive from the Figure is that these lines overlap to a very 
considerable extent – the “island” story does not describe England. There may be 
rural areas where it is more applicable, but even in rural areas, only 59% of pupils 
attend their nearest school.  
Persistence in school attendance may arise in a second way. This might be described 
as a “dynasties” argument. Even without the rigidity of the “island” model, pupils 
living in particular locations always go to the same school. Furthermore, because of 
the operation of the housing market and the established persistence in area poverty, 
particular locations always house poor families. The poverty of succeeding 
generations is correlated and the exam score of one generation of pupils drawn from   10 
that area is correlated with the poverty of the next. Thus a correlation is generated 
between the poverty status of a pupil in cohort t – 6 going to the focus school, that 
school’s score and the poverty status of the pupil in cohort t. In econometric terms, 
estimating: 
i i i i t t i a u k c f b a q + + + + = - d.Z . . 6 ), , (           (3) 
will yield a biased estimate of b because the nature of the location is un-controlled for, 
is correlated with fi, and with the poverty of the previous cohort of pupils who 
generated the school quality score. The answer therefore is to control for the 
characteristics of the area, Li. Given the “dynasties” argument, this necessarily 
captures the nature of the locations that the previous attendees of the focus school 
came from. If they came from different locations, then the correlation does not arise in 
the first place.  
d) Good schools and local schools 
We specialise the analysis of the qa(i, t), t-6 -- fi assignment map to the question of 
whether a pupil attends her nearest (local) school. The key issue is the quality of the 
school, and the pupil’s FSM status. In particular, we are interested in the interaction 
of the two – whether the impact of FSM differs depending on the quality of the local 
school. The probability that i ￿ n(i,t) we write as 
*
it p , and set out as follows: 
( ) it i i t t i n i t t i n i it L q f q f p e g f c b a + + + + + + = - - d.Z 6 ), , ( 6 ), , (
* . . . .    (4) 
Again, we include controls for the local area and neighbourhood, as well as other 
individual pupil controls. As with the analysis discussed above, it remains true that we 
do not attempt here to distinguish demand for school places from the assignment rule. 
Thus a finding that particular pupils do not attend their local school may indicate 
demand or may indicate the operation of the assignment rule through the rationing of 
the available places. To reiterate, equation (4) represents the outcome of the 
assignment rule and parental response to that, not a causal relationship between 
location and school entry.   11 
3. Data 
We combine administrative data from the Department of Education and Skills (DfES) 
with geo-coded data from commercial and government sources. We focus on the 
secondary school that children join at age 11
8.  
a) Data on Pupils 
Our core dataset is the Pupil Level Annual School Census (PLASC), kindly provided 
by the DfES. This is a census of all children in state schools in England, taken each 
year in January. This was first carried out and made available to researchers in 2002, 
and we use the three PLASCs currently available. PLASC provides a number of 
personal characteristics, and can also be linked to other items from the DfES’s 
National Pupil Database (NPD), including each pupil’s test score history.  
Data on pupils includes the following characteristics: gender, within-year age, 
ethnicity, and an indicator of Special Educational Needs (SEN, which measures 
learning or behavioural difficulties). The key variable for our purposes is an indicator 
of family poverty, the eligibility for Free School Meals (FSM). This is dependent on 
receipt of state welfare benefits: eligibility for Income Support or Unemployment 
Benefit brings eligibility for FSM. Income Support largely captures single parents but 
also includes support for disability. Of course, welfare receipt and so FSM status is a 
crude, dichotomous measure of poverty, and we should be cautious about simply 
comparing pupils with FSM across different areas of the country and different micro 
neighbourhoods. The neighbourhood data discussed below helps here. Measurement 
error may also be an issue. Our FSM variable is probably a very good measure of the 
FSM status of children
9, though the FSM variable is a noisy measure of poverty 
status
10. The proportion of children eligible for FSM is less than the proportion 
counted as poor using standard measures, so FSM children are likely to be poorer than 
the average poor child. 
We use test score data from one of the Key-stage tests that students take throughout 
schooling. We use the Key-stage 2 test taken at age 11 as the pupils finish their spell 
                                                 
8 There are a few areas with a middle school structure, which we omit.  
9 See Barker, 2006, for a discussion of the multi-stage checking of the schools’ data: 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/PLUG/userguide/anna.ppt  
10 For some evidence, see http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/PLUG/events/130906/vignoles.ppt    12 
in primary school. This is a nationally set group of tests (in English, Maths and 
Science), marked outside the school. This represents a measure of ability, and will 
also be correlated with parental resources.  
b) Data on Schools 
To characterise the quality of secondary schools, we choose the publicly available and 
widely quoted measure of the proportion of a school’s pupils achieving grades A* to 
C in at least 5 GCSE exams at age 16. These exams are important, are nationally set 
and come at the end of compulsory schooling. Typically a pupil takes exams in 8 – 10 
subjects. Tables showing each school’s score are published in the national and local 
press each year. Until recently, these were the only real quality information available, 
but a number of value-added tables are now also published (see Wilson, 2003). These 
exams scores reflect both the teaching of the school (value added) and the 
composition of the school (peer group). Thus basing a decision on the %5A*-C can be 
thought of as basing it on a weighted average of value added and peer group. We 
define a good school as being in the top third nationally of the distribution of %5A*-C 
scores. The dating of this score is important – we use the score for each school from 
the time that the cohorts made their decisions on school applications, so deriving from 
the results of a cohort of pupils 6 years older. We consider alternative definitions of 
good schools as a robustness check.  
c) Location and Distance 
Crucially for this analysis, we have access to each pupil’s full postcode. This locates 
them quite precisely, to within 100m. We also have the coordinates of the school, 
which locates it exactly. We rely on the postal geography of the UK
11 for this 
analysis. Overall, there are about 1.78m unit postcodes covering 27.5m addresses
12. 
On average, there are 15 addresses in a unit postcode. A subset of these addresses will 
house families with children attending state secondary schools. In our data, in any one 
cohort we have over 333,000 distinct unit postcodes, covering half a million children, 
and 544,320 distinct unit postcodes in all.  
                                                 
11 For further details see http://www.statistics.gov.uk/geography/postal_geog.asp (accessed 24/3/2006) 
12 As of May 2005, in the UK as a whole.    13 
Using pupils’ postcodes, we match in data on neighbourhoods. These measures of 
neighbourhood fulfil two roles: they measure the deprivation of the neighbourhood 
and home peer group, and also provide an additional factor proxying the individual’s 
own household context. We have data at two different scales. Firstly, we have 
matched pupil’s postcodes to the Mosaic classification
13 of that address. Mosaic 
classification is a postcode level dataset that categorises each postcode in the UK into 
one of 61 different types on the basis of demographics, socio-economics and 
consumption, financial measures, and property characteristics and value. Over 400 
variables are used to construct these classifications and as such this provides a rich 
picture of pupils’ neighbourhoods at a very local level. Secondly, we use the Index of 
Multiple Deprivation (IMD) produced from administrative data
14. This ranks every 
ward
15 on a range of criteria (income, employment, health, education and skills, 
housing, and geographical access to services); we use the overall weighted index.  
Distance can be measured in a number of different ways. Given the size of this 
dataset, it is only computationally feasible to use straight-line distances. These are 
computed from coordinates and the application of Pythagoras’ theorem. This is 
inferior in the sense that it will fail to take account of natural barriers such as rivers or 
hills, and it will also misrepresent distances where the road network is not very dense, 
but some experimentation suggested it was not too inaccurate
16. We use this 
information to identify each pupil’s nearest school.  
d) Sample selection decisions 
We take the cohort of new entrants into state secondary schools from each PLASC, 
that is, pupils in their first year of secondary school. There are roughly 0.5m pupils in 
each cohort, so our full sample is 1,566,415 pupils. We specialise this to particular 
sub-groups in the analyses below. We distinguish between selective and non-selective 
LEAs, defining the former as having at least 10% of pupils in grammar schools, and 
                                                 
13 This is commercial geo-demographic data, kindly provided to us by Experian. For more information 
see http://www.experian.co.uk/business/products/data/113.html. 
14 For more information see 
http://www.odpm.gov.uk/stellent/groups/odpm_urbanpolicy/documents/page/odpm_urbpol_608140.hc
sp. 
15 A ward is a small geographical unit, containing on average around 12,000 people.  
16 In fact, we compared this straight-line method with the travel distance method for three areas – a 
rural area, an urban area outside London and a London LEA. We identified each pupil’s nearest school 
using both methods. In each of these areas, the correspondence was around 85%. It therefore seems that 
the approximation given by the straight-line method is reasonably accurate.   14 
omit selective LEAs. This cuts out 13.4% of the pupil total, leaving just over 
1,356,000. We omit pupils from some special schools, and pupils are omitted if they 
have missing values for data. The sample for the overall regressions in Table 2 is 
1,239,888 – some 91% of the available total in non-selective LEAs.  
The means and some indication of variation of all the variables used are in Table 1. 
4. Results 
We present four sets of results. First, we quantify the relative chances of children 
from FSM-eligible families attending a good school. Second, we exploit within-
postcode variation to control completely for location and to isolate any remaining 
influence of poverty status. Third, we focus on one aspect of location – the feasibility 
of school choice. Fourth, we analyse which pupils attend their local school, as a 
function of their own characteristics and the school’s characteristics.  
a) Overall Picture 
Overall, 29% of children have places in good schools using our definition
17. Define 
for each LEA the ratio of FSM-eligible children in good schools to all FSM-eligible 
children, denoted g
f. Similarly, the equivalent ratio for non-FSM-eligible pupils is g
nf. 
The means and quantiles of these variables are in panel B of Table 1. In Figure 2 we 
cross-plot g
nf and g
f for the non-selective LEAs.  We see that in all LEAs the latter is 
below the former (bar Sandwell, just above), and that there is a strong correlation 
between the two. There is also considerable variation in the g
f /g
nf ratio. A simple 
regression across LEAs on g
f /g
nf shows it to be lower in poorer areas and lower in 
London and other urban areas.  
This establishes at LEA level that children from poor families as a group have 
(unconditionally) lower probabilities of attending a good school, we need to use the 
micro data to understand where this comes from. Our econometric strategy is not to 
identify school demand in this paper. Given the basic structures of the problem 
(parents’ demand for school places, and an assignment rule), parents then formulate 
their response strategy to the assignment rule in the light of their preferences and 
characteristics. The most relevant part of the explicit assignment rules is the role of 
location. Other factors that may implicitly matter to schools include a pupil’s ability 
                                                 
17 We take the top one third of schools, which does not translate exactly into one third of pupils.   15 
and background. Parents will attempt to choose location and to make any implicit 
advantages of their children visible to the admissions authorities. Our strategy is to 
isolate how much of the difference in outcomes works through location, and how 
much through other channels, controlling for location. 
We estimate the likelihood that a child is assigned to a good school using the three 
combined entry cohorts and the definition of a good school as discussed above. Table 
2 reports the probit results for three specifications. The first specification simply 
controls for FSM status and LEA and cohort dummies. FSM status is negative and 
strongly significant. Computing the marginal effects and taking the average, we see 
that children from poor families are 17.3 percentage points less likely to attend a good 
school. This is equivalent to about half the chance of non-poor families.    
Column 2 adds in personal characteristics. The coefficient on FSM status falls 
substantially to 0.443, and to an average marginal effect of 13 percentage points. We 
also see that pupils scoring highly at the KS2 are more likely to be assigned to a good 
school. The interpretation of this is not that there is explicit selection on the KS2 
scores, as these are not published when school assignment decisions are made. This 
effect is capturing correlation of KS2 with general ability and/or family background. 
We discuss the gender coefficient in the next sub-section, and the ethnicity 
coefficients shortly. 
Turning to column 3, we add a rich set of neighbourhood controls. We use the Mosaic 
classification for a characterisation of the very immediate neighbourhood, and the 
ward level IMD to describe the broader area. We also include the full set of 
interactions of these two. These all add significantly to the explanatory power of the 
model (raising the pseudo-R
2 from 0.123 to 0.228). Notably for our purposes the 
coefficient on FSM status more than halves to 0.178. The mean marginal effect of 
FSM status falls from 17.3 points in column (1) to 4.8 points in column (3)
18. Finally 
we return to the role of ethnicity in school assignment. Column 2 shows that holding 
other personal characteristics fixed, pupils of Black Caribbean heritage, other Black 
heritage, Bangladeshi or Pakistani ethnicity are less likely to be assigned to a good 
                                                 
18 Using the column 3 estimates, we have explored some of the variation in the marginal effects, 
available from the authors. The smallest impact of FSM is for an FSM-eligible child in a poor 
neighbourhood in a poor LEA. There are larger impacts for pupils in richer areas, where being one of 
the fewer poor children has a greater effect on your likelihood of going to a good school.   16 
school. However, once we control for neighbourhood characteristics, all of these 
effects reverse, apart from that for Bangladeshi ethnicity children.    
In table 2b we re-run these regressions with the additional variable of distance from 
the pupil’s home to the nearest good school. As with the other location variables, we 
are not claiming that this is exogenous. In fact, its inclusion reduces the coefficient on 
FSM status a little, but not a huge amount given the inclusion of other location 
controls.  
Returning to the main argument of this section, a comparison of columns 1 and 3 
suggests that about two thirds of the unconditional effect of FSM is related to 
location. Note further that since all these analyses include LEA dummies, this is all 
about within-LEA variation. Children from poor families face a reduced chance of 
being assigned to a good school in large part because of where they live.  
b) Within-postcode variation 
It is clear that distance and location matter for school assignment. The only way to 
control fully for location is to compare individuals living in the same place – that is, 
holding all location-related factors constant. We can do this in a very precise way 
with our data. The full unit postcode locates individuals to just a handful of dwellings, 
and this allows us to exploit within-postcode variation in school assignment and FSM 
status. Sample selection issues are discussed below.  
About two thirds of secondary school pupils share their unit postcode with at least one 
other. Table 3 compares the sample of such pupils with the full dataset. They are 
marginally more likely to be poor, and have slightly lower KS2 scores. This is 
because single-pupil-postcodes are more likely to be found in richer, rural areas. 
Table 4 shows the structure of the data. Over 400,000 live in a 2- or 3-pupil postcode, 
in some 200,000 postcodes. Even in the postcodes with just two children, they both 
attend the same school in only 61% of cases. For the others, the cases where all attend 
the same school is the minority. This gives further illustration of the highly complex 
spatial patterns of school attendance (see Burgess et al 2006). The picture of clear and 
distinct catchment areas does not describe the situation in England at all well. There is 
less but still considerable variation in poverty status in multi-child postcodes; there 
are around 280,000 postcodes (involving over 1m pupils) with variation in FSM   17 
eligibility. Overall, in 40% of postcodes with 2 or more pupils in there is variation in 
FSM status. 
Using this data, we ask: for two pupils who are next door neighbours, one from a poor 
family and one not, are they likely to go the same quality school or not? Before 
presenting regression results, Figures 3 and 4 provide a view of the data. The top left 
panel of Figure 3 takes all two-pupil postcodes. Dividing these locations into those 
where both pupils are FSM-eligible, where neither are, and where one of the two is, 
we plot the mean school quality separately for FSM and non-FSM pupils. The 
remaining panels of the figure repeat this exercise for 3-, 4- and 5-pupil postcodes, 
providing more overlap of the two groups. A number of patterns are very clear across 
these groups. First, within each postcode type, FSM-eligible pupils attend lower 
scoring schools than do ineligible pupils. The gap is consistent across all the panels at 
about 3 percentage points. Second, the poorer the postcode, the lower the average 
school quality that its inhabitants attend. Crudely comparing the two relationships, it 
appears that the difference in mean school quality between poor and non-poor 
students within a postcode type is about equivalent to the difference in mean school 
quality between postcodes that are 40% poor and those that are 60% poor. Third, the 
average school quality of the data point at 100% poor declines marginally as we look 
across 2-pupil, 3-pupil etc postcodes. This is because higher-pupil postcodes are 
denser, more urban, and therefore on average poorer.  
Figure 3 compares across postcodes; Figure 4, like the following regressions, exploits 
within-postcode variation. The top left panel takes all 2-pupil postcodes. Within each 
postcode we order the pupils and compute the difference in their FSM status and 
equivalent difference in the quality of school assigned to them. In this case the former 
can take the values –1, 0 or 1. So for each postcode we have the within-postcode FSM 
difference and the within-postcode quality difference. In the figure we plot the 
distribution of these differences. The panel shows that poor children are assigned to 
less good schools, both at the mean and the quantiles shown. The bivariate regression 
coefficient is –0.024. The next panel take 3-pupil postcodes. For each postcode we 
order pupils, take all pairwise differences and average. The other panels use 4- and 5-
pupil postcodes. The story is the same across all panels, showing a negative 
relationship.    18 
The regression results pooling using all the observations are in Table 5. Column (1) 
includes just FSM status and column (2) adds other pupil characteristics. We see that 
children from poor families do go to lower scoring schools on average. This effect is 
around 1.5 percentage points, around 9% of the standard error of school quality in this 
dataset. Standard errors are clustered at postcode-cohort level. In terms of the other 
variables, differences in gender have no effect. This is interesting, and contrasts with 
the estimated lower chance for a boy of attending a good school found above, though 
it may be due to a small number of single-sex schools being dropped in this analysis. 
Comparing these results suggests a correlation between where families with boys and 
girls live relative to the location of good schools. Age has no effect, and children from 
minority ethnic backgrounds tend to attend better schools.  
It is useful to compare the impact of FSM eligibility on the chance of attending a good 
school across the different specifications. In Table 6 we run OLS regressions with 
fixed effects on the earlier (dichotomous) dependent variable: attend a good school or 
not. Whilst not perfect, this seems the most transparent technique given the need to 
deal with over 100,000 postcode fixed effects. We successively add personal and 
neighbourhood characteristics alongside LEA fixed effects, and then add in postcode 
fixed effects. The first 3 columns are OLS-FE versions of Table 2 (on a slightly 
different sample because of missing data). Accounting only for personal 
characteristics and LEA dummies, poor children face a lower probability of around 10 
percentage points. Once we add in postcode dummies capturing all location effects, 
this falls to 2.2 percentage points. We take two points from this – most of the reason 
for poor children’s lower chances is accounted for by where they live, but not all of it.  
Using within-postcode variation potentially brings a selection effect, but one for 
which the bias can be signed. Assume dwelling-specific house prices within a unit 
postcode are the same. We would expect FSM-eligible households living in the same 
street as ineligible households to be among the better off of such households. 
Similarly, FSM-ineligible households living next door to FSM-eligible families are 
likely to be relatively poor compared to other FSM-ineligible households. Thus the 
income differences between households of different FSM status and living in the same 
street are likely to be lower than unconditional income differences between 
households of different FSM status. If the link between FSM status and school 
assignment is estimating a relationship between household income and school   19 
assignment, our estimated differences are likely to be an underestimate of the true 
relationship.  
Summarising, these results control completely for location and suggest that children 
from FSM eligible families on average attend schools that rank less highly in the 
school league tables. This analysis takes into account all aspects of a location, 
including distance from schools, and neighbourhood characteristics. Reverse 
causation seems very unlikely, because the measure of quality used is essentially 
unrelated to the performance of the children in the postcode. First, the measure relates 
to a cohort of children passing through the school six years previously. Second, even 
if generations of children from the same house went to the same schools, in these 
within-postcode comparisons the focus children clearly constitute a negligible fraction 
of the actual attendees of the schools (around 5%). Third, the use of within-postcode 
variation controls for any location effects.  
c) Robustness: different definitions of good schools 
For robustness, we consider alternative definitions of a good school. First, we take the 
top third of the distribution within an LEA rather than nationally; second, we define 
good in terms of value-added rather than GCSE league table performance; and third, 
we combine both of these. The first is largely about whether parents look at the 
national or LEA comparators. The LEA effects included in the earlier results would 
have taken out any first order linear effects, but there may be important interaction 
effects too. Changing to define a good school based on value-added is more of a 
substantive difference, and implies slightly different questions. The broad question we 
are addressing here is to what extent children from poor families attend good schools. 
Using GCSE league table scores as the basis for defining a good school includes the 
two aspects of what schools provide: teaching effort (value added) and peer group 
quality (prior attainment). Clearly, a definition based on value added alone will 
produce a different ranking, and may change the findings. The question is also 
different in another sense. GCSE league table scores are widely publicised, and it is 
reasonable to assume that parents are broadly familiar with them. Value-added is not 
(until very recently) published, and the argument would have to be that parents know 
through informal means whether a school provides good teaching; this may not be a   20 
very accurate process. So the mechanism linking parental preference for schools to 
school quality is different. 
We re-run the core specifications from Tables 2b and 6 using these alternative 
definitions of good schools. The results are in Table 7, along with the original results 
from Tables 2b and 6. In both, we see that the impact of FSM status is stronger at 
LEA than national level, and that the coefficient is lower using value-added than 
GCSE. Focussing on panel (b) of the Table, comparing column 5 (postcode fixed 
effects) and column 2 (just individual characteristics) gives us the relative importance 
of location and other factors. Varying the definition makes little difference: the 
column 5 coefficient as a fraction of that in column 2 is 22.0% for our basic 
definition, 21.8% using GCSE and the LEA distribution, 22.2% using value-added 
and the national distribution, and 21.8% using value-added and LEA distribution.  We 
would argue therefore that the main results are robust to different definitions of the 
key variable of a good school.  
d) Role of Choice 
One of the factors that relates to a location is the feasibility of school choice. In this 
sub-section we examine whether the penalty to FSM eligible children varies with the 
degree of school choice. The arguments suggesting that the penalty may be more or 
less in areas with high degrees of choice were set out above. 
We approach this in three different ways. First, we re-run the overall national 
regressions in Table 2, interacting FSM status with our measure of the degree of 
choice: whether the pupil has three schools within 2km of her home. Second, we run 
these regressions separately for pupils in London, in other urban areas, and in rural 
areas
19. This split is highly correlated with the feasibility of choice. Third, we re-run 
the within-postcode regressions separately for ten groups of postcodes, split by deciles 
of choice.  
Table 8 presents the results for the first two of these analyses. The interaction between 
FSM status and pupil choice is negative and significant. The interpretation of this is 
that conditional on the other observable characteristics, FSM-eligible pupils have a 
lower chance of attending a good school in an area where choice is high than in an 
                                                 
19 A school is defined as urban/rural if it is in an urban/rural Local Authority District, and in London if 
it is in a London LEA.   21 
area where choice is low. Columns 2 to 4 of the table confirm this finding. The FSM 
difference is higher in London than other urban areas and higher again than in rural 
areas.  
However, the characteristics of the FSM population may well differ in relevant ways 
across these areas, affecting the results. While the inclusion of the full set of Mosaic 
dummies, broader IMD and their interactions along with LEA dummies should absorb 
a lot of that heterogeneity, the best way to control for location is to use the within-
postcode variation. We re-run the postcode fixed effects regressions on the data split 
up by choice feasibility in Table 9. The feasibility of choice is measured by the 
minimum distance to reach three schools, with the lowest radius indicating the 
greatest feasibility of choice (see Burgess et al, 2006, for more details). The pattern of 
FSM coefficients is flat until the last two deciles of choice, when it moves towards 
zero (though not significantly so). Controlling for location, the lower school quality 
assigned to poor children does not vary much in association with the feasibility of 
choice.  
e) Going to the Local School 
We have argued that the pattern of children being assigned to schools is complex 
(recall Figure 1). The regression evidence above summarises outcomes from that 
process. In this section, we specialise the analysis to a particular question: what 
influences the probability that a child attends her nearest school? The relationship of 
going to the local school, the quality of that school (qn(i, t), t-6) and the pupil’s 
characteristics are shown in Figure 5. The quality variable on the horizontal axis is 
split into ventiles, and the vertical axis marks the fraction of pupils going to their local 
school for that quality of school. Panel A plots the relationship separately by FSM 
status. A number of points are clear. For non-FSM eligible pupils, there is a strong 
upward trend: the better the local school, the more likely are such pupils to attend. 
The probability ranges from less than 0.3 for the lowest score schools, to around 0.6 at 
the top. The final data point at the highest quality school relates almost entirely to 
schools with additional admissions criteria, principally faith schools. They draw 
pupils from a much wider catchment area. There is a strong contrast with FSM 
eligible pupils: over the top 75% of the distribution, the chance of a poor child 
attending the local school declines slightly for increasing school quality. In Panel B,   22 
we split pupils in a different way. We rank the 61 Mosaic postcode types by their 
national % FSM, and plot the relationship for those living in poor neighbourhoods 
(bottom third of Mosaic codes) and affluent neighbourhoods (top third). The same 
picture is clear. Affluent households living near a poor school, with high probability 
commute their child to another school. Over bulk of the range, poor households do not 
vary much in the rate of going local, even declining in the top third of quality.  
But these graphs are unconditional, and it may be that some version of the “dynasties” 
argument means that persistence in school assignment produces a correlation between 
school quality and pupils’ FSM status. We report the results of estimating equation (4) 
in Table 10. In addition to the usual pupil characteristics, column (1) includes the 
quality of the local school (in ventiles), and this interacted with FSM status. Column 
(2) adds the full set of local area and neighbourhood controls from Table 2 column 3. 
Column (3) further adds: a dummy for whether the pupil’s nearest school is located in 
an urban area; a dummy for whether the pupil’s nearest school is located in a London 
LEA; interactions of school quality group with the pupil’s KS2 mean score; the 
distance of the pupil to her nearest school, distance squared, distance cubed and all 
these distances interacted with FSM status.  
The key results are the interaction of local school quality and the pupil’s FSM status. 
The influence of quality is clear: higher quality is associated with a higher probability 
of attending the school. The interaction of quality and FSM shows a declining pattern, 
mirroring the graphs in Figure 5. Moving across the columns, this pattern is 
marginally flatter in column 3 with all the controls, but remains strong. The fitted 
pattern derived from column 3 is plotted in Figure 5, panel C.  
We repeat that we do not interpret location here as exogenous. Location is chosen by 
some parents to influence school assignment, and “living near a good school” is an 
objective of that decision. Note that this will likely interact with the varying feasibility 
of choice around England. We control for that with the distance and other 
neighbourhood controls in Table 10.  
5. Conclusions 
We study the assignment of children to schools. The particular focus is the assignment 
of children from poor families to schools featuring high up in the published league   23 
tables. The primitives of the problem are parents’ demand for school places, and an 
assignment rule to resolve allocation at over-subscribed schools. Parents then 
formulate their response strategy to the assignment rule in the light of their 
preferences and characteristics. The most relevant part of the explicit assignment rules 
is the role of location. Other factors that may matter to schools include a pupil’s 
ability and background. Parents will attempt to choose location and to make any 
implicit advantages of their children visible to the admissions authorities. Children 
from poor families may stand a lower chance of attending a good school for a number 
of reasons. First, where they live; second, because over-subscribed schools find ways 
of choosing pupils according to their incentives and this correlates with FSM status; 
third, because middle class parents are better at working the system of school 
admissions; or fourth, the costs of exercising choice (acquiring the information, 
transport costs) may be prohibitive. Our strategy is to isolate how much of the 
difference in outcomes works through location, and how much through other 
channels, controlling for location. 
In a typical LEA in England a child from a poor family is half as likely to attend a 
good secondary school as a non-poor child. Much of this is due to where they live 
within the LEA. But location is not all: comparing children living as neighbours, and 
controlling for observable differences, the poorer neighbour is less likely to go to a 
good school. This gap is 2 percentage points, compared to an overall gap of 14 
percentage points. Thus location accounts for most of the gap, but not all.  
We can compare across areas of England with differing degrees of choice. Controlling 
completely for location using within-postcode variation, the FSM-differential is 
relatively flat once we control fully for location.  
How are we to interpret the findings, and how to relate them to the school choice 
debate? The promise of a well-functioning school choice system is that it reduces or 
eliminates the role of location, thereby enabling children from poor families to access 
good schools. The countervailing view is that a choice system without fully flexible 
school size will increase the role of choice by schools, and the scope for the middle 
class to beat the system. Our findings cast some light on this debate. The results show 
that location is associated with most but not all of the differential school quality. We 
find consistent significant differences in school quality even among next-door 
neighbours, but the magnitude of these are low, relative to the raw differences. The   24 
importance of location suggests that school choice may have an important part to play 
in narrowing the gap in admission to good schools. By contrast, the roles of choice by 
schools and middle class strategising operate given location and account for a smaller 
part of the gap. A policy which reduces the factor contributing to the greater part of 
the gap, at the potential expense of widening the smaller part, might have some 
attractions
20.  
                                                 
20 Whether the policy just approved by the UK parliament will make such a difference is waiting to be 
seen.    25 
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Table 1: Summary statistics for full sample 
 
Panel A: 1,354,985 observations for all variables ( except *could only be calculated for 1,321,676 
pupils and ***could only be merged for 1,306,007 pupils) 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
P25  P75 
Dichotomous         
Good school (=1 if school is in top third of school 
%5 A-C distribution) 
0.324  0.47  0  1 
Pupil has 3 schools within 2KM of home 
postcode* 
0.349  0.48  0  1 
Pupil FSM eligibility  0.176  0.38  0  0 
Male  0.508  0.50  0  1 
White  0.851  0.36  1  1 
Black Caribbean  0.016  0.13  0  0 
Black African  0.014  0.12  0  0 
Black Other  0.009  0.09  0  0 
Indian  0.022  0.15  0  0 
Pakistani  0.026  0.16  0  0 
Bangladeshi  0.010  0.10  0  0 
Chinese  0.003  0.05  0  0 
Other ethnicity  0.022  0.15  0  0 
Ethnicity not known**  0.027  0.16  0  0 
School located in an urban area  0.706  0.46  0  1 
School located in London  0.126  0.33  0  0 
School located in rural area  0.168  0.37  0  0 
SEN without statement  0.168  0.37  0  0 
SEN with statement  0.023  0.15  0  0 
English as first language  0.914  0.28  1  1 
Continuous         
School %5 A-C  0.482  0.17  0.35  0.61 
Pupil KS2 mean score  27.299  4.20  25  31 
IMD score***  28.556  18.24  13.39  40.96 
 
Panel B: Only 116 LEAs due to 5 LEAs having Good/Total places = 0. 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
P25  P75 
Good Places  3,606.62  4,215.2  930  4,547 
Total Places  11,165.69  8474.3  6,093  12,464 
Good/Total places  0.293  0.18  0.149  0.418 
Good Places – FSM pupils  270.16  247.6  104  367 
Total Places – FSM pupils  1,969.86  1,470.1  1,233  2,205 
Good/Total places – FSM pupils  0.169  0.13  0.070  0.0251 
Good Places – Non-FSM pupils  3,336.46  3,997.43  830  4,191 
Total Places – Non-FSM pupils  9,195.84  7,600.0  4,899  10,438 
Good/Total places – Non-FSM pupils  0.320  0.19  0.180  0.463 
G
f/G
nf  0.503  0.25  0.370  0.595 
 
Notes: 
**Old ethnicity codes from PLASC 2002 were used for all pupils. This group includes pupils age 16 in 
PLASC 2003 and 2004 who did not have an ethnicity record in PLASC 2002.   29 






1  2. 
Marg 
eff





FSM only   
Personal 
characteristics   
Area 
characteristics   
-0.594  -0.173  -0.443  -0.130  -0.178  -0.048  Pupil FSM 
eligibility  (29.75)**    (27.86)**    (13.11)**   
    0.061  0.019  0.038  0.012  Pupil KS2 mean 
score      (22.77)**    (14.13)**   
Male      -0.079  -0.024  -0.098  -0.027 
      (4.38)**    (5.01)**   
Black Caribbean      -0.179  -0.053  0.025  0.006 
      (3.71)**    (0.56)   
Black African      0.090  0.028  0.270  0.077 
      (1.32)    (4.34)**   
Black Other      -0.057  -0.017  0.089  0.025 
      (1.24)    (1.94)   
Indian      0.105  0.033  0.192  0.054 
      (1.68)    (3.36)**   
Pakistani      -0.177  -0.053  0.038  0.011 
      (2.69)**    (0.62)   
Bangladeshi      -0.277  -0.081  -0.117  -0.032 
      (4.02)**    (2.00)*   
Chinese      0.237  0.075  0.288  0.083 
      (5.56)**    (6.33)**   
Other ethnicity      0.071  0.022  0.158  0.044 
      (2.29)*    (5.14)**   
    0.195  0.062  0.076  0.021  Ethnicity not 
known      (3.87)**    (1.31)   
        -0.009  -0.003  Index of Multiple 
Deprivation Score          (1.51)   
LEA dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Cohort dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Mosaic dummies  No    No    Yes   
IMD*Mosaic 
dummies  No    No    Yes   
Constant  -0.500    -2.316    -1.204   
  (33.72)**    (29.81)**    (4.85)**   
Observations
2  1321591    1321591    1263256   
Notes: 
z-scores in parentheses; standard errors in all specifications clustered on LEA. 
  *Significant at 5%  **Significant at 1% 
Also included in both specifications 2 and 3 but not reported are: month of birth, English as first 
language, SEN with and without statement dummies. Specification 3 also includes mosaic dummies 
and these interacted with IMD.  
 
1 Marginal effects are average marginal effect over the sample. For binary variables, reported is the 
average difference (over the sample) in probabilities between the dummy taking value 1 and taking 
value 0. For continuous variables, this is the sample average of f(X'ß)*ßj, where f(.) is the standard 
normal pdf. 
 
2 Observations for five LEAs with no ‘good’ schools as defined here are necessarily dropped from the 
probit. These LEAs are Barnsley, Islington, Knowsley, Luton and Rochdale. 
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Table 2b: Probit of whether pupil goes to a good school 
 
  1.  Marg eff
1  2.  Marg eff
1  3.  Marg eff
1 
  FSM only   
Personal 
characteristics   
Area 
characteristics   
Pupil FSM eligibility  -0.613  -0.165  -0.456  -0.122  -0.190  -0.047 
  (33.55)**    (31.33)**    (14.05)**   
Pupil KS2 mean score      0.063  0.018  0.040  0.011 
      (23.34)**    (14.42)**   
Male      -0.122  -0.034  -0.145  -0.036 
      (5.57)**    (6.17)**   
Black Caribbean      -0.190  -0.051  0.005  0.001 
      (4.17)**    (0.11)   
Black African      0.100  0.028  0.261  0.067 
      (1.43)    (4.06)**   
Black Other      -0.077  -0.021  0.066  0.017 
      (1.70)    (1.47)   
Indian      0.056  0.016  0.156  0.040 
      (0.83)    (2.60)**   
Pakistani      -0.211  -0.057  0.013  0.003 
      (3.05)**    (0.20)   
Bangladeshi      -0.332  -0.087  -0.162  -0.040 
      (4.59)**    (2.69)**   
Chinese      0.190  0.054  0.257  0.066 
      (4.07)**    (5.22)**   
Other ethnicity      0.045  0.012  0.135  0.034 
      (1.47)    (4.32)**   
Ethnicity not known      0.186  0.053  0.056  0.014 
      (3.42)**    (0.96)   
-0.144  -0.041  -0.146  -0.041  -0.153  -0.042  Distance to nearest 
good school (km)  (11.30)**    (11.29)**    (11.24)**   
        -0.006  -0.001  Index of Multiple 
Deprivation Score          (1.03)   
LEA dummies             
Cohort dummies             
Mosaic dummies             
IMD*Mosaic 
dummies             
Constant  0.009    -1.853    -0.834   
  (0.21)    (21.00)**    (3.44)**   
Observations
2  1298097    1298097    1248597   
Notes: 
z-scores in parentheses; standard errors in all specifications clustered on LEA. 
  *Significant at 5%  **Significant at 1% 
Also included in both specifications 2 and 3 but not reported are: month of birth, English as first 
language, SEN with and without statement dummies. Specification 3 also includes mosaic dummies 
and these interacted with IMD.  
 
1 Marginal effects are average marginal effect over the sample. For binary variables, reported is the 
average difference (over the sample) in probabilities between the dummy taking value 1 and taking 
value 0. For continuous variables, this is the sample average of f(X'ß)*ßj, where f(.) is the standard 
normal pdf. 
 
2 Observations for five LEAs with no ‘good’ schools as defined here are necessarily dropped from the 
probit. These LEAs are Barnsley, Islington, Knowsley, Luton and Rochdale.   31 
 




Pupils who share the same 
postcode with at least one 
other pupil  

















Table 4: Numbers of pupils per postcode 
 
Numbers of pupils 
within postcode   Observations 
Percentage of postcodes 
where pupils all have the 
same FSM eligibility 
status 
Percentage of postcodes 
where pupils all attend 
the same school 
1  205,700  100%  100% 
2  222,714  82.87%  61.65% 
3  197,430  71.04%  45.70% 
4  159,848  62.39%  37.27% 
5  125,640  54.78%  32.33% 
6  91,632  48.76%  28.42% 
7  67,900  43.03%  25.67% 
8  49,080  38.03%  23.11% 
9  34,290  32.44%  21.52% 
10  23,840  31.75%  20.51% 
11  17,204  26.92%  16.43% 
12  11,316  24.81%  16.22% 
13  8,372  22.36%  11.96% 
14  6,020  20.93%  14.42% 
15  4,035  21.19%  14.50% 
>15  9,578  13.88%  9.32% 
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Table 5: Postcode-cohort FE regressions of school quality on personal 
characteristics on non-selective LEAs 
 
  1.  2. 
  Full sample 
Full 
sample 
Pupil Free School Meal 
eligibility 
-0.019  -0.015 
  (25.49)**  (20.06)** 
Pupil KS2 Mean score    0.003 
    (38.92)** 
Male dummy    -0.001 
    (1.70) 
Black Caribbean    0.006 
    (2.13)* 
Black African    0.017 
    (4.63)** 
Black Other    0.009 
    (2.36)* 
Indian    0.011 
    (4.05)** 
Pakistani    -0.001 
    (0.39) 
Bangladeshi    -0.005 
    (1.64) 
Chinese    0.019 
    (2.86)** 
Other    0.008 
    (3.87)** 
Ethnicity Unknown    0.013 
    (6.46)** 
Constant  0.473  0.382 
  (3605.67)**  (130.88)** 
Observations  1028899  1028899 
R-squared  0.86  0.86 
 
Notes: 
t-stats in parentheses      *Significant at 5%    **Significant at 1% 
Standard errors clustered by postcode-cohort. Regressions also include month of birth, SEN with and 




   33 





  Overall (LEA-cohort FE)  Postcode-cohort FE 










-0.140  -0.100  -0.027  -0.029  -0.022  Pupil FSM 
eligibility  (27.64)**  (24.70)**  (13.45)**  (17.50)**  (13.14)** 
  0.016  0.007    0.005  Pupil KS2 mean 
score    (31.55)**  (22.11)**    (27.98)** 
Male    0.003  0.000    -0.001 
    (2.82)**  (0.14)    (1.00) 
Black Caribbean    -0.041  0.010    0.006 
    (5.26)**  (1.48)    (0.94) 
Black African    -0.001  0.039    0.027 
    (0.13)  (5.36)**    (3.34)** 
Black Other    -0.023  0.017    0.007 
    (2.58)*  (2.19)*    (0.91) 
Indian    0.015  0.032    0.005 
    (1.25)  (3.18)**    (0.71) 
Pakistani    -0.035  0.013    -0.017 
    (3.22)**  (1.26)    (2.72)** 
Bangladeshi    -0.021  0.015    -0.016 
    (1.72)  (1.54)    (2.35)* 
Chinese    0.053  0.058    0.028 
    (4.53)**  (5.26)**    (1.76) 
Other ethnicity    0.012  0.030    0.016 
    (1.63)  (5.11)**    (3.10)** 
  0.049  0.024    0.036  Ethnicity not 
known    (3.34)**  (1.40)    (6.78)** 
    -0.007      Index of Multiple 
Deprivation Score      (2.52)*     
Constant  0.322  -0.133  0.325  0.302  0.140 
  (352.74)**  (9.10)**  (3.40)**  (1005.46)**  (19.39)** 
Observations  1028899  1028899  993704  1028899  1028899 
R-squared  0.17  0.18  0.28  0.87  0.87 
Adjusted R-
squared  0.17  0.18  0.28  0.68  0.68 
 
Notes: 
t-stats in parentheses  *Significant at 5%  **Significant at 1% 
 
1 Overall FE includes LEA-cohort fixed effects and reports SEs clustered by LEA-cohort. Postcode FE 
includes postcode-cohort fixed effects and reports SEs clustered by postcode-cohort. Dependent 
whether is 0,1, whether pupil attends a good school. This uses OLS-FE 
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Table 7: Different Definitions of a ‘good’ school 
 
(a) Specification from Table 2b 
 
Coefficient on Pupil FSM eligibility: 
Definition of ‘good’ 
school 
1  2  3 
Metric:  Top third 
of: 
FSM only  ME  Personal 
characteristics 
ME  Area 
characteristics 
ME 
               
GCSE  National  -0.613  -0.165  -0.456  -0.122  -0.190  -0.047 
    (33.55)**    (31.33)**    (14.05)**   
               
GCSE   LEA  -0.551  -0.171  -0.414  -0.129  -0.175  -0.052 
    (27.12)**    (26.40)**    (14.68)**   
               
VA  National  -0.340  -0.105  -0.273  -0.084  -0.115  -0.034 
    (14.87)**    (15.52)**    (8.73)**   
               
VA  LEA  -0.344  -0.117  -0.275  -0.093  -0.116  -0.038 
    (17.07)**    (18.33)**    (10.52)**   
               
Obs
    1330477    1330477    1280188   
ME = marginal effect  
For additional variables and notes, see notes to Table 2b 
 
 
(b) Specification from Table 6 
 
Coefficient on Pupil FSM eligibility: 
Definition of ‘good’ 
school 
Overall (LEA-cohort FE)  Postcode-cohort FE 
    1  2  3  4  5 
Metric:  Top third 
of: 




FSM only  Personal 
characteristics 
             
GCSE  National  -0.140  -0.100  -0.027  -0.029  -0.022 
    (27.64)**  (24.70)**  (13.45)**  (17.50)**  (13.14)** 
             
GCSE   LEA  -0.162  -0.119  -0.037  -0.034  -0.026 
    (40.00)**  (36.04)**  (16.46)**  (27.98)**  (21.82)** 
             
VA  National  -0.092  -0.072  -0.022  -0.020  -0.016 
    (20.25)**  (18.99)**  (9.69)**  (16.82)**  (13.38)** 
             
VA  LEA  -0.110  -0.087  -0.028  -0.024  -0.019 
    (23.93)**  (23.36)**  (11.74)**  (18.03)**  (14.39)** 
             
Obs
    1028899  1028899  993704  1028899  1028899 
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Table 8: Probit of whether pupil goes to a good school 
 
  1. 
Marg 
eff
1  2. 
Marg 
eff
1  3. 
Marg 
eff




      London    Urban    Rural   
Pupil FSM eligibility  -0.135  -0.037  -0.333  -0.087  -0.149  -0.038  -0.062  -0.020 
  (9.97)**    (10.99)**    (11.60)**    (4.11)**   
Pupil KS2 mean score  0.038  0.010  0.060  0.016  0.039  0.010  0.020  0.006 
  (14.69)**    (10.78)**    (11.69)**    (7.83)**   
                 
-0.109  -0.030              FSM*pupil has 3 
schools in 2KM  (4.10)**               
0.001  0.000              KS2 score*pupil has 3 
schools in 2KM  (0.64)               
-0.009  -0.002  -0.007  -0.002  -0.008  -0.002  0.021  0.007  Index of Multiple 
Deprivation Score  (1.50)    (1.06)    (0.87)    (1.26)   
LEA dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Cohort dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Mosaic dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
IMD*Mosaic dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes   
Observations  1239888    159047    884816    206339   
Notes: 
z-scores in parentheses  *Significant at 5%  **Significant at 1% 
 
1 Marginal effects are average marginal effect over the sample. For binary variables, reported is the average difference (over the sample) in probabilities between the dummy 
taking value 1 and taking value 0. For continuous variables, this is the sample average of f(X'ß)*ßj, where f(.) is the standard normal pdf. 
 
2 Observations for five LEAs with no good schools as defined here are necessarily dropped from the probit. These LEAs are Barnsley, Islington, Knowsley, Luton and 
Rochdale. 
 
3 Also included but not reported are gender and ethnicity dummies, month of birth, English as first language, SEN with and without statement dummies and a constant in all 
specifications.  
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Table 9: Postcode-cohort FE on School Quality by deciles of School 
choice feasibility 
 












(5.14)**  101,426 




(4.59)**  101,426 










(4.79)**  101,414 




(4.00)**  101,422 










(2.78)**  101,427 




(3.47)**  101,418 










(3.10)**  101,421 
 
Notes: 
t-stats in parentheses      *Significant at 5%    **Significant at 1% 
 
1 Postcode-cohort FE regressions as per table 6 with standard errors clustered by postcode-cohort. 
2 FSM is the only explanatory variable, as per column 1 of table 6. 
3 Includes all other personal characteristics, as per column 2 of table 6. 
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  1.  Marg eff
1  2.  Marg eff
1  3.  Marg eff
1 
Pupil FSM 
eligibility  0.442  0.157  0.438  0.153  0.373  0.126 
  (13.15)**    (13.95)**    (12.55)**   
Pupil KS2 mean 
score  -0.015  -0.005  -0.014  -0.005  -0.047  -0.016 
  (12.54)**    (14.38)**    (17.62)**   
             
    -0.010  -0.004  -0.012  -0.004  Index of Multiple 
Deprivation Score      (1.92)    (2.45)*   
             
0.107  0.039  0.106  0.038  0.096  0.033  2 
(1.92)    (1.94)    (1.76)   
0.194  0.070  0.190  0.068  0.199  0.068 
3  (3.35)**    (3.32)**    (3.37)**   
0.281  0.101  0.281  0.100  0.289  0.098 
4 
(4.11)**    (4.22)**    (4.21)**   
0.323  0.116  0.331  0.117  0.362  0.123 
5  (4.66)**    (4.97)**    (5.46)**   
0.430  0.153  0.428  0.150  0.437  0.147 
6  (6.55)**    (6.69)**    (6.86)**   
0.464  0.165  0.477  0.167  0.493  0.165 
7 
(6.99)**    (7.51)**    (7.72)**   
0.503  0.178  0.508  0.176  0.502  0.168 
8  (7.39)**    (7.67)**    (7.82)**   
0.558  0.196  0.557  0.193  0.586  0.194 
9  (7.16)**    (7.28)**    (7.87)**   
0.571  0.201  0.586  0.202  0.603  0.199 
10 
(8.51)**    (8.81)**    (9.48)**   
0.589  0.207  0.618  0.212  0.611  0.202 
11  (7.40)**    (7.93)**    (8.21)**   
0.642  0.224  0.658  0.225  0.653  0.215 
12  (8.20)**    (8.59)**    (8.78)**   
0.689  0.239  0.694  0.235  0.683  0.224 
13 
(9.82)**    (9.78)**    (9.63)**   
0.707  0.245  0.742  0.250  0.719  0.235 
14  (9.61)**    (10.19)**    (10.16)**   
0.757  0.260  0.772  0.259  0.735  0.239 
15  (10.43)**    (10.15)**    (10.20)**   
0.777  0.266  0.788  0.264  0.752  0.244 
16 
(10.44)**    (10.19)**    (9.99)**   
0.844  0.286  0.866  0.286  0.814  0.262 
17  (10.71)**    (10.62)**    (10.27)**   
0.850  0.287  0.884  0.291  0.798  0.257 
18  (10.06)**    (10.07)**    (9.35)**   
0.698  0.241  0.720  0.243  0.625  0.206 
19 
(7.37)**    (7.23)**    (6.35)**   







(2.02)*    (1.91)    (3.31)**   
-0.128  -0.047  -0.122  -0.044  -0.114  -0.039 
2 
(2.86)**    (2.84)**    (3.01)**   
-0.094  -0.034  -0.092  -0.033  -0.076  -0.026 
3 
(2.25)*    (2.30)*    (1.99)*   
-0.137  -0.050  -0.145  -0.052  -0.123  -0.042 
FSM* School 
quality group 
4  (3.27)**    (3.56)**    (3.33)**     38 
-0.204  -0.074  -0.211  -0.075  -0.188  -0.064  5 
(4.57)**    (4.85)**    (4.80)**   
-0.208  -0.075  -0.208  -0.074  -0.172  -0.059 
6  (4.64)**    (4.72)**    (4.09)**   
-0.269  -0.097  -0.281  -0.100  -0.235  -0.081 
7 
(6.42)**    (6.80)**    (6.31)**   
-0.338  -0.121  -0.342  -0.121  -0.286  -0.098 
8  (8.19)**    (8.41)**    (7.52)**   
-0.328  -0.117  -0.340  -0.121  -0.306  -0.104 
9  (7.23)**    (7.61)**    (7.23)**   
-0.414  -0.146  -0.432  -0.152  -0.376  -0.127 
10 
(8.51)**    (8.88)**    (8.68)**   
-0.448  -0.158  -0.470  -0.164  -0.389  -0.132 
11  (7.97)**    (8.26)**    (7.67)**   
-0.528  -0.183  -0.555  -0.192  -0.477  -0.160 
12  (9.65)**    (10.49)**    (9.86)**   
-0.601  -0.207  -0.629  -0.215  -0.536  -0.178 
13 
(13.01)**    (13.91)**    (13.47)**   
-0.633  -0.216  -0.669  -0.227  -0.560  -0.186 
14  (11.94)**    (12.75)**    (11.64)**   
-0.736  -0.247  -0.740  -0.248  -0.630  -0.207 
15  (12.65)**    (15.22)**    (14.18)**   
-0.739  -0.248  -0.784  -0.260  -0.667  -0.217 
16 
(13.85)**    (15.62)**    (14.42)**   
-0.841  -0.275  -0.891  -0.289  -0.757  -0.243 
17  (16.00)**    (16.90)**    (15.60)**   
-0.977  -0.309  -1.037  -0.325  -0.853  -0.269 
18  (16.93)**    (19.32)**    (17.23)**   
-1.174  -0.353  -1.190  -0.359  -0.964  -0.297 
19 
(18.79)**    (21.07)**    (18.42)**   
-1.194  -0.356  -1.210  -0.362  -0.861  -0.271 
20 
(14.48)**    (14.64)**    (10.45)**   
LEA dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Cohort dummies  Yes    Yes    Yes   
Mosaic dummies  No    Yes    Yes   
IMD*Mosaic 
dummies  No    Yes    Yes   
Observations  1349117    1269180    1269180   
 
Notes: 
z-scores in parentheses  *Significant at 5%  **Significant at 1% 
 
1 Marginal effects are average marginal effect over the sample. For binary variables, reported is the 
average difference (over the sample) in probabilities between the dummy taking value 1 and taking 
value 0. For continuous variables, this is the sample average of f(X'ß)*ßj, where f(.) is the standard 
normal pdf. 
 
2 Standards errors are clustered by LEA in all specifications. All specifications include gender and 
ethnicity dummies, dummies for month of birth, SEN (with and without statement) and English as a 
first language. Specification 2 adds area characteristics (IMD and mosaic category). Specification 3 is 
the same as specification 2 but also includes dummies for whether pupils’ nearest school are located in 
urban areas and a London LEA, interactions of school quality group with KS2 mean score, distance to 
nearest school, distance squared and distance cubed and these distances interacted with FSM, urban 
and rural dummies. 
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Figure 1: School Distance Contours in Birmingham 
 
 
The large shapes represent the locations of 5 schools, and the dots represent a sample of pupils 
attending those schools. The lines are 50% distance contours round each school. Thanks to Rich Harris 
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Figure 2:  Good to total places ratio for FSM pupils against good to total 
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Figure 3: FSM vs Non-FSM gaps in mean school percentage 5 A-C for 2, 3, 4 and 5 pupil postcodes 
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Figure 4: Differences in school quality by differences in FSM status by postcode   43 
Figure 5a: Proportion of pupils attending their nearest school by FSM and 
ventiles of school quality (Raw data) 
 
 
Figure 5b: Probability of pupils attending their nearest school by poor and 
affluent postcodes and ventiles of school quality 
Notes: 
Poor postcodes are those with mosaic categories in the top third of categories as 
ranked by proportion FSM and affluent postcodes are those in the bottom third.   44 
Figure 5c: Fitted probability of pupils attending their nearest school by 
FSM status and ventiles of school quality 
 
 
1Based on col 3 of table 10 for a white, female pupil born in September with average KS2 mean, 
English as first language, no SEN, attending a school in an urban area and with the mean distance to 
nearest good school 